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NOTES

State and Local Law Enforcement
Response to Undocumented
Immigrants
CAN WE MAKE THE RULES, TOO?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2005, in the towns of New Ipswich and Hudson, New
Hampshire,
local
police
arrested
eight
suspected
undocumented immigrants1 on charges of criminal trespass
when they failed to provide proper identification.2 Local police
resorted to this tactic after the federal authorities declined to
take action against the suspects.3 This novel approach to
immigration regulation at the state level drew national
attention as several other local law enforcement offices
throughout the country contemplated administrating a similar
approach.4 On August 12, 2005, however, a state judge
dismissed these charges, stating that they represented an
unconstitutional attempt to regulate the enforcement of

1
The term “undocumented immigrant” is used to describe persons who “(1)
have entered the country without inspection or with false documents; (2) have stayed
beyond the expiration of their visas; (3) are working without authorization; or (4) are
otherwise in violation of immigration laws.” Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to
the Fourth Amendment?: Undocumented Immigrants’ Rights After INS v. LOPEZMENDOZA and UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 999,
999 n.1 (1992).
2
Anand Vaishnav, N.H. Judge Dismisses Immigrants’ Trespass Charges,
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 13, 2005, at B3.
3
Id.
4
Andrew Wolfe, Immigrants Cleared of Trespass Charges, NASHUA
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 12, 2005.
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immigration violations.5 The judge reasoned that the police
action violated the supremacy clause because the federal
regulation was “so pervasive” that it left no room for
supplementation by the states.6
While the charges against these eight suspects were
dismissed, the fact that law enforcement felt compelled to take
the action they did reflects the growing nation-wide concern
about undocumented immigrants who live and work in the
United States. Typically, handling immigration matters is
something that falls within the purview of the federal
government. This New Hampshire case illustrates, however,
that the federal government does not always take action, or at
least, as swiftly as some might hope. As a result, local
authorities across the country have started to take their own
action by expanding criminal statutes to cover undocumented
immigration, discriminatorily applying the law against
undocumented immigrants, and acting as deputies of the
federal immigration law. They have resorted to these methods
because it is thought that the federal government’s limited
number of agents is inadequate to address the large numbers of
undocumented immigrants.7
This Note argues that the immigration legislation
should remain within the purview of the federal government
and that the state and local governments should neither
expand laws nor arbitrarily and discriminatorily administer
existing laws to address the issue of undocumented
immigration, despite the perceived incapability of the federal
government to handle the issue. Instead, the local authorities
should adhere to the systematic delegation of authorities that
are made available by the existing federal immigration laws.
Part II of this Note provides background information regarding
5
Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474, 1475 (Nashua D. Ct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/criminal_trespass_
decision.pdf.
6
Id. (quoting Appeal of Conservation, 147 N.H. 89 (2001)).
7
Mohar Ray, “Can I See Your Papers?” Local Police Enforcement of Federal
Immigration Law Post 9/11 and Asian American Permanent Foreignness, 11 WASH. &
LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 197, 197 (2005).

[W]ith a maximum of 5,500 federal immigration agents available to enforce
immigration controls and an estimated eight million undocumented
immigrants within the United States, the federal government is in dire need
of increased manpower if it chooses to prioritize undocumented immigration
control and criminal immigration enforcement issues on the federal agenda.
Id.
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the undocumented immigration situation within state and local
communities, as well as a brief overview of the powers at both
the federal and state level dealing with immigration matters.
Part III describes and analyzes the various and conflicting
ways that state and local authorities address undocumented
immigrants within their communities. Part IV argues that
these state and local methods should not be used to combat
illegal immigration because of their unlawful expansion of
established authority and inherent ineffectiveness. Instead,
this Note advocates that adherence to the established method
of regulated delegation of local enforcement by federal
authorities is the more appropriate response to the
undocumented immigration issues.
II.

BACKGROUND

The issue of undocumented immigration is of significant
importance. The population of undocumented immigrants is
reportedly at a record high and the rate of increase appears to
be steady.8 It is the local communities that must ultimately
absorb the impacts of this trend. The communities have voiced
their concerns and are now looking for solutions.9 The federal
government has primary authority to regulate and enforce the
However, the steady increase in the
immigration law.10
population of undocumented immigrants reveals that the
federal government does not have adequate resources to
address the situation alone.11 Where the federal government
lags, the onus falls on state and local law enforcement forces to
assist in the cause.12 This has increasingly placed state and
local authorities under scrutiny. The question becomes if and
how state and local law enforcement agencies can take matters
into their own hands. Both statutory law and the general
judicial support for state and local enforcement of immigration
law uphold the view that this is a viable option.13 Serious
8
Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State & Local Law
Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 324-26
(2005).
9
David M. Turoff, Note, Illegal Aliens: Can Monetary Damages be Recovered
from Countries of Origin Under an Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?,
28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 179, 179-80 (2002).
10
IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 25 (10th ed.
2006).
11
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 330.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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appropriate limits of this authority should be set.
A.
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where

the

Undocumented Immigration Issues in Context

The federal government appears to be overwhelmed by
its efforts to control immigration, especially considering the
large and increasing number of undocumented immigrants.
There are an estimated eight to ten million undocumented
immigrants living within the United States.14 The efforts made
by the federal government to control the influx had little
success as the population has shown a continuous growth at a
rate of approximately 400,000 undocumented immigrants a
year.15 One former U.S. ambassador16 has criticized the “very
chaotic [federal immigration] system” as being under-funded
and lacking any true cooperative effort with local authorities.17
The Department of Homeland Security is said to be “choking on
massive workloads” with an estimated backlog of 4.1 million
pending immigration applications of various kinds.18
The backlog at the federal level can create havoc on the
state and local levels, since it is ultimately the local community
that must absorb the growing population of undocumented
immigrants.
The main complaints voiced by these
communities are that these undocumented immigrants are
responsible for a significant amount of job displacement among
documented immigrants and native-born Americans, adversely
affect their general way of life, and drain valuable resources
from the communities forced to deal with this sizable
population.19

14
Id. at 324 n.1. See also Paul Magnusson, Go Back Where You Came From:
Across the Country, a Grassroots Backlash Against Illegals is Building, BUS. WK., July
4, 2005, at 86 (according to a new study by the Pew Hispanic Center, 1.4 million
Mexicans have crossed over into the U.S. with 85% of them entering illegally since
2000).
15
Hearing on Comprehensive Immigration Reform II Before the S. Comm. On
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Mark Krikorian, Ctr. for Immigr.
Stud.) [hereinafter Immigration Reform II].
16
George Bruno, a private attorney in Manchester, and former U.S.
ambassador to Belize.
17
Stephen Seitz, Judge: Fining Illegals for Trespass Intrudes on Federal
Authority, UNION LEADER, Aug. 13, 2005 (quoting George Bruno).
18
Immigration Reform II, supra note 15.
19
Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of
Latin American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39
U. RICH. L. REV. 1355, 1380 (2005).
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In past years of rising unemployment, state and local
communities have contended that immigrants, in particular
undocumented immigrants, are responsible for taking jobs
away from American citizens.20 Empirical studies conducted in
the early 1990s estimated that the total cost of job
displacement due to undocumented immigrants would reach
approximately $171.5 billion between 1993 and 2002.21 A
recent study has also shown that new undocumented
immigrants have substantially increased their ability to find
work while the documented immigrants and native-born
American citizens have seen a decrease in their ability to find
employment between 2000 and mid-2003.22 Even the Supreme
Court has supported the view that undocumented immigrants
deprive citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs and that
their continued employment poses a threat to the wages and
working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens.23
The impact of lost jobs is especially concentrated in the
area of low-skilled American workers where an estimated forty
to fifty percent of wage loss is due to undocumented
immigrants.24 It is estimated that there are more than 100,000
day laborers25 distributed over at least four hundred different
hiring sites within the United States.26 These workers for hire
supply the increasing demand for cheap labor found in various
communities.27
Aside from taking jobs away, many communities
contend that these groups create “unsanitary conditions” and
are simply “aesthetically detrimental” to their neighborhood,

20

Id.
Turoff, supra note 9, at 184 n.40.
22
Frei, supra note 19, at 1379.
23
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (1976): Employment of illegal aliens
in times of high unemployment deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs;
acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working
conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and
legally admitted aliens; and employment of illegal aliens under such conditions can
diminish the effectiveness of labor unions. Id.
24
Frei, supra note 19, at 1379.
25
Day laborers can be defined as individuals who gather at a particular
hiring site to sell their labor for an hour, the day, or a particular job. Due to their
undocumented status or their inability to speak English, these laborers turn to this
trade out of necessity. Mauricio A. Espana, Day Laborers, Friend or Foe: A Survey of
Community Responses, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1979, 1980-81 (2003).
26
Steven Greenhouse, Front Line in Day Laborer Battle Runs Right Outside
Home Depot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A1.
27
Espana, supra note 25, at 1980.
21
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thus lowering the quality of life for many local residents.28 The
complaints that the day laborers are unsanitary and
aesthetically detrimental demonstrate the general disfavor
that some local communities find with the presence of
undocumented immigrants.29 The citizens of towns bordering
Mexico cite this as a major issue within their communities.30 In
one border town residents complained that the constant flow of
approximately three hundred undocumented immigrants that
travel through their town each night is overwhelming.31 The
residents associate this growing population with an increase in
crime, nuisance, and reckless behavior.32 Regardless of the
validity of these concerns,33 the undocumented immigrants,
whether working as day laborers or in transit from a border
country, are highly visible, and local residents point the finger
at them for unfairly forcing them to shoulder increased
economic and social burdens.34
The burdens that the local communities complain about
are supported by empirical evidence from recent studies.35 One
study estimated that $5.4 billion was spent in public assistance
to undocumented immigrants in 1990.36 That same study
stated that $11.9 billion was spent in public assistance and
displacement costs for an undocumented population of 4.8
million in 1992.37 More recent studies support these findings
with an estimated $24 billion spent on social services for
With an undocumented
undocumented immigration.38
immigration population that is already estimated to be nearly
double the amount cited in 1992,39 it is not surprising that the
state and local communities are beginning to look to their local
28

Id.; See also Jon Ward, Arrests Not Linked to Illegals Crackdown, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2004, at B1 (local police receive “complaints about disorderly conduct by
some of the day laborers such as public drunkenness, urinating in public and
harassment of women who were entering a nearby rape crisis counseling center.”).
29
Frei, supra note 19, at 1380.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
There are arguments that these assertions are facially invalid and that
undocumented immigrants actually provide positive contributions to the U.S. economy
and help create jobs in urban areas. Turoff, supra note 9, at 184 n.41.
34
Frei, supra note 19, at 1380.
35
Turoff, supra note 9, at 183-84.
36
Id. at 183.
37
Id. at 183-84.
38
Id. at 184.
39
Current estimates state that there are eight to ten million undocumented
immigrants within the U.S. Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 327.
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law enforcement agencies to address these issues that they
deal with on a daily basis.
B.

Exclusive Federal Authority over Immigration Law

Historically, the federal government has had exclusive
authority over immigration issues since the late nineteenth
century.40 In 1849, the Supreme Court stated that the “whole
subject of the admission of foreigners into the United States,
and the terms upon which they shall be admitted, belongs, and
must belong, exclusively to the national government.”41 The
text in both the Constitution and the subsequent legislation by
Congress, as well as general foreign policy concerns, empower
the federal government with this exclusive authority.
The enumerated and implied Constitutional powers are
viewed as the source of Congress’ exclusive authority over
immigration issues.42 The enumerated powers are derived from
the commerce,43 naturalization,44 migration and importation,45
and war power clauses.46 The implied Constitutional powers
stem from the notion that this authority is simply an incident
of sovereignty.47 This concept has its foundation in the
“accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within

40

Although there was no established federal immigration law until 1875,
there was limited state legislation in the area to varying degrees. Frei, supra note 19,
at 1361, 1363.
41
Smith v. Turner (Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 305 (1849).
42
Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25.
43
Congress is authorized to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44
Congress is granted the power to “establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
45
“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
1.
46
Congress has the authority to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 11. This war power “permits the federal government to stop the entry of every
alien and to expel them from the U.S.” Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25.
47
Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25; Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (J. Field declared that the power to
exclude foreigners is “an incident of sovereignty.”).
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its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon
such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”48
Congress’s pervasive legislative activity further
establishes that the federal government’s “plenary authority
over immigration extends to the control of aliens within the
borders of the U.S.”49 Congress demonstrated this authority
when it first enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) in 1952, which remains the basic statute of current
immigration law to this day.50 Within the general framework
regarding admittance and deportation, there are many
provisions of the INA that regulate the activities of foreign
nationals within the United States.51 Since its enactment,
there have been several significant amendments to the INA
which have reached even further into the regulation of foreign
national activity.52 One recent example is the USA PATRIOT
Act which was enacted into law in response to the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.53
With regard to the administration of the federal law,
Congress has delegated most of its immigration authority to
the executive branch.54 Now, instead of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”), the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), part of the executive branch, has nearly all of
the authority to administer and enforce the federal
immigration laws.55 The DHS is subdivided into three bureaus:
the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (“UCIS”),56
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and Customs

48

Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, IMMIGRATION PRIMER 4 (1985).
50
Stephen Yale-Loehr, Overview of U.S. Immigration Law, 1477 PLI/CORP
49, 56 (2005).
51
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (2000) (aliens who seek exemption or discharge
from the U.S. armed forces on account of their alien status are permanently barred
from seeking citizenship); 8 U.S.C. § 1428 (2000) (temporary absences for “ministerial
or priestly functions of a religious denomination” are excused and considered being
“physically present and residing in the United States for the purpose of
naturalization”); 8 U.S.C. § 1430(c) (2000) (special naturalization procedures for those
who can prove that they work for certain nonprofit organizations within the U.S.).
52
Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 56.
53
Id. at 57.
54
Fragomen & Bell, supra note 49, at 4.
55
Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 59.
56
The UCIS Bureau performs the functions of adjudication of petitions and
applications for immigration benefits. ROBERT C. DIVINE, IMMIGRATION PRACTICE 2-2
(2006-2007 ed. 2006).
49
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and Border Protection (“CBP”) bureaus.57 The regulations
promulgated by these various agencies provide the basic
structure for enforcing the INA.58
Separate and apart from the Constitution and the
federal statutes lie foreign policy concerns related to the direct
impact that immigration matters have on relations with other
countries.59 These concerns grant inherent authority over this
area to the national government.60 Therefore, the federal
government must act in uniformity, as it does in all other areas
of foreign policy, in order to advance two important aspects of
immigration regulation.61 First, the manner in which the
United States decides to treat foreign nationals, including
deciding which ones to admit or expel, impacts U.S. relations
with the home country of those nationals.62 Second, the federal
government proactively utilizes immigration policy to advance
significant foreign policy objectives that reach far beyond the
admittance of individuals into the United States.63 These two
critical aspects are the main reasons why the Supreme Court
has ruled in favor of federal exclusivity over immigration
matters.
For example, when the Court struck down a
California statute that regulated the arrival of foreign
passengers in Chy Lung v. Freeman, it noted that the federal
government alone would be called to respond to any foreign
policy consequences of state created immigration policy;
therefore, the federal government alone should be the one to
create such policy.64
57
Id. The CBP and ICE Bureaus handle the functions of border patrol,
detention and removal, intelligence, investigations and inspections. Id.
58
Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 59.
59
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws In The Inherent Authority Position: Why
Inviting Local Enforcement Of Immigration Laws Violates The Constitution, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 965, 991 (2004).
60
Kurzban, supra note 10, at 25.
61
Pham, supra note 59, at 994.
62
Id. at 992-93.
63
Id. at 993-94.
64
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1875).

If [the federal] government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with
any foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of
these relations upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this,
done so foolish a thing as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws
whose enforcement renders the general government liable to just
reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit to the States
the acts for which it is held responsible?
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. The passage of
laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations
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The effect of post September 11th immigration
legislation on relations between the United States and Mexico
provides a specific example of how immigration policy decisions
directly affect foreign policy.65 The United States severely
restricted the immigration admittance standards in the
interests of national security after the attacks by terrorists on
September 11, 2001.66 Prior to these attacks, the United States
and Mexico were involved in negotiations that would have
established a historic bilateral migration agreement between
the two countries.67 However, the September 11th terrorist
attacks halted these discussions.68 This was seen as a principal
driving force behind the Mexican President’s decision to break
from the United States and vote against military action in
Iraq.69 Foreign relations between the two countries have been
described as “colder” ever since.70
The changes that the federal government has made to
the definitions regarding the admittance of refugees
demonstrate the second foreign policy concern surrounding
immigration.71 The President, in consultation with Congress,
has the authority to determine the number of refugees to be
admitted based on “humanitarian concern” or for other reasons
of national interest.72 The United States has historically used
this power to modify the refugee guidelines to admit nationals
from countries that the United States considered adversaries.73
By labeling these foreign nationals “legitimate refugees,” the
United States uniformly denounced the policies advanced by
their home countries.74 The federal government would lose the
ability to send any strong unified statement without the
exclusive authority to create these definitions.
to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the character
of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to
the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her
pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.
Id. at 280.
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Pham, supra note 59, at 992.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Pham, supra note 59, at 993.
Id. at 992 n.139.
Id. at 993.
Id.
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State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law

Despite what appears to be overwhelming authority for
exclusive jurisdiction over immigration matters by the federal
government, some argue that state and local law enforcement
agencies can enforce immigration laws and have had inherent
authority to do so ever since Congress enacted the Immigration
and Nationality Act in 1952.75 Three sources that support this
viewpoint are: (1) specific text within the INA; (2) federal
judicial decisions;76 and (3) Congressional amendments that
followed the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) that added further explicit authority to the powers of
the state and local law enforcement agencies.77
1. Statutory Support for Local Enforcement of
Immigration Laws
There is text within the INA that specifically supports
local enforcement of immigration law. Title 8 Section 1324(c)
states that:
No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrests for a
violation of any provision of this section except officers and
employees of the Service designated by the Attorney General, either
individually or as a member of a class, and all other officers whose
duty it is to enforce criminal laws.78

Some argue that state and local law enforcement personnel fall
under the “all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal
laws” provision.79 This interpretation is most strongly
supported by the INA’s legislative amendment history.80
When Section 1324 was first enacted in 1954, the text
read: “and all other officers of the United States whose duty it
However, subsequent
is to enforce criminal laws.”81
amendments ultimately removed the phrase “of the United
States” from the statute.82 This reflects the Congressional
75

Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop: Local Enforcement of
Federal Immigration Law, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83, 86-87 (2005).
76
Id. at 85-87.
77
Id. at 83-84; Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 344.
78
8 U.S.C. § 1324(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
79
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 341-42.
80
Hethmon, supra note 75, at 86.
81
Id. (emphasis added).
82
Id.
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intent not to limit the arrest authority to members of the
federal government agencies, but rather to include state and
local law enforcement departments as well.83
In order to clarify any confusion surrounding the state
and local enforcement authority, Congress passed the Doolittle
Amendment to the AEDPA of 1996.84 The amended Act now
states:
(a) In general
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, to the extent permitted
by relevant State and local law, State and local law enforcement
officials are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who:
(1) is an alien illegally present in the United States; and
(2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United
States and deported or left in the United States after such
conviction, but only after the State or local law enforcement
officials obtain appropriate confirmation from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the status of
such individual and only for such a period of time as may be
required for the Service to take the individual into Federal
custody for purposes of deporting or removing the alien from
the United States.
(b) Cooperation
The Attorney General shall cooperate with the States to assure that
information in the control of the Attorney General, including
information in the National Crime Information Center, that would
assist State and local law enforcement officials in carrying out duties
under subsection (a) of this section is made available to such
officials.85

After the terrorists attacked the United States on
September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act,
the Homeland Security Act, and the Enhanced Border Security
and Visa Entry Reform Act.86 All of these amendments had a
common stated goal: “to improve federal and local cooperative
efforts to detect and detain aliens participating in terrorist
activities in the United States.”87 Section 287(g) of the INA
addresses this particular legal concern by specifically
authorizing the Attorney General to contract with state and
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 86-87.
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 344.
8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000).
Hethmon, supra note 75, at 83-84.
Id. at 84.
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local agencies and have them perform certain functions of a
federal immigration officer.88 The specific provision states that:
[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a
State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an
officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by
the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation
of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out
such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and
to the extent consistent with State and local law.89

State or local law enforcement officials that operate under one
of these agreements receive extensive immigration law
training.90 They are also given much broader authority to
enforce the immigration laws as compared to their nondeputized counterparts who only retain general inherent
authority.91
2. Judicial Support for Local Enforcement of
Immigration Law
Some courts have upheld the general proposition that
state officials are not preempted from enforcing the federal
immigration laws.
In People v. Barajas, the California
Supreme Court did not find any express limitation on the local
enforcement of specific areas of federal immigration law.92 The
defendant in Barajas was originally arrested by local police for
a traffic violation and for possession of a knife.93 The arresting
police officer proceeded to question the defendant about his
immigration status after reading him his Miranda rights.94
The defendant replied that he had left his “green card” at
home.95 The police issued a misdemeanor citation and released
the defendant.96 The local police still suspected that the
defendant was an undocumented immigrant and therefore

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 342.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000).
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 345.
Id.
People v. Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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inquired with federal officials about the defendant’s status.97
The INS agent informed the police that the defendant was
apprehended on two prior occasions and was “formally
deported” the second time.98 The INS agent then instructed the
local police to arrest the defendant for violating Section 1326 of
Title 8 by reentering the country after deportation without
express permission from the Attorney General.99 The local
police officers arrested the defendant as instructed.100
The defendant in Barajas claimed that the local police
officers did not have the authority to arrest him for violations
The court rejected this
of federal immigration law.101
argument and stated that the specific text found in Sections
1325 and 1326 of Title 8 at the time did not contain the
limiting language that Section 1324 had.102 The court stated
that all three sections were originally drafted together, yet only
Section 1324 was subsequently amended to include only
“officers of the United States.”103 The court drew from this a
clear Congressional intent that “arrests for violation of Section
1324 were to be made only by federal personnel, while by clear
implication, Sections 1325 and 1326 arrests were to be made by
state and local officers as well.”104 The court went on to cite the
supremacy clause as a “two-edged sword, and in the absence of
a limitation, the states are bound by it to enforce violations of

97
98
99

Id.
Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
Id.

Any alien who—
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has
departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or
removal is outstanding, and thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States,
unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for admission; or
(B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and removed, unless
such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain such advance
consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under Title 18, or
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2000).
100
Barajas, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
101
Id. at 198.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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the federal immigration laws.”105 This proposition strongly
supports state and local enforcement authority by not only
deeming it to be constitutionally acceptable, but a required
obligation.
All of the federal circuit courts that have ruled on this
issue have held similarly when it comes to criminal violations
of federal immigration laws. In Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, the
Ninth Circuit placed an interesting gloss over the Barajas
decision.106 The defendants in Gonzalez, like the ones in
Barajas, were stopped by local police, questioned, arrested, and
detained in order to be released to federal immigration
authorities.107 The defendants made similar claims that these
arrests were unlawful under federal immigration law.108 The
Gonzalez court ruled against them, however, stating that the
text of Title 8 Section 1325 did not preclude local police from
enforcing the statute.109 The distinguishing aspect of the
Gonzalez decision lies in the particular attention to the fact
that the Barajas opinion was based on a criminal offense.110
The court stated that local authorities must distinguish
between the criminal violation of illegal entry and the civil
violation of illegal presence when enforcing violations of the
federal immigration statute.111 The opinion went on to state
that the civil provisions of the code constituted a “pervasive
regulatory scheme, as would be consistent with the exclusive
federal power over immigration.”112
In Lynch v. Cannatella, the Fifth Circuit also addressed
the issue of state and local enforcement of federal immigration
laws.113 The court struck down the defendants’ arguments for
105

Id. at 199.
Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
107
Id. at 472.
108
Id. at 474.
109
Id. at 475-77.
110
Id. at 476.
111
Id. at 477.
112
Gonzalez, 722 F.2d at 477. It has been argued that this is merely dicta and
outside the scope of the decision since the civil provisions of the INA were not an issue
in this case. Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 333. However, in support of the
Ninth Circuit position, some states have specifically authorized the arrests for criminal
violations of the INA but do not permit arrests based solely on undocumented
immigrant status since these individuals may only be in violation of the civil provisions
of the INA. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF NEW YORK, INFORMAL
OPINION NO. 2000-1, (2000) available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/
2000/informal/2000_1.html.
113
Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1987).
106
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preemption and broadly held that there was no federal
immigration law that precluded the enforcement of
immigration law by state and local law enforcement
personnel.114 With this broad statement the Lynch court
seemed to indirectly disagree with the civil and criminal
distinction drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez.115
In United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth Circuit
rendered a decision that seemed to be more consistent with the
broad holding in Lynch than the more restrictive decision set
The Oklahoma police arrested the
forth in Gonzalez.116
defendant in Vazquez-Alvarez based on his suspected
Federal immigration authorities
undocumented status.117
revealed that he had been previously arrested on felony
charges and subsequently deported just as the defendant in
Bajaras.118 The Vazquez-Alvarez Court reviewed the post
AEDPA version of Title 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(c) and ruled that
one of the main purposes in amending the statute was to settle
any confusion regarding the authority of state and local
authorities to enforce the federal immigration law.119 The
Tenth Circuit used this reasoning to uphold the general
concept that federal immigration law did not preempt the
114
Id. at 1371. The court referenced the 1970 version of 8 U.S.C. § 1223(a)
which outlined the duties of agents whose vessels bring aliens into U.S. ports and the
duties of the immigration officials with regard to the removal of those aliens from the
vessel. Despite including the text “immigration officer” within the text of § 1223(a) the
court stated that “[n]o statute precludes other federal, state, or local law enforcement
agencies from taking other action to enforce this nation’s immigration laws.” Id.

Entry through or from foreign territory and adjacent islands
Upon the arrival at a port of the United States of any vessel . . . bringing
aliens . . . the immigration officers may order a temporary removal of such
aliens for examination and inspection . . . but such temporary removal shall
not be considered a landing, nor shall it relieve vessels . . . from any
obligations which, in case such aliens remain on board, would, under the
provisions of this chapter, bind such vessels . . . . A temporary removal of
aliens from such vessels . . . ordered pursuant to this subsection shall be
made by an immigration officer at the expense of the vessel . . . and such
vessel . . . shall, so long as such removal lasts, be relieved of responsibility for
the safekeeping of such aliens: Provided, that such vessels . . . may with the
approval of the Attorney General assume responsibility for the safekeeping of
such aliens during their removal . . . for examination and inspection, in which
event, such removal need not be made by an immigration officer.
8 U.S.C. § 1223(a) (1970).
115
See Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1371.
116
United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1999).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 1300.
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ability of state and local law enforcement personnel to enforce
the federal statutes.120
The essential holding of the Bajaras opinion has been
supported by the subsequent federal court decisions in the
Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. The general rule that federal
immigration law does not preempt state and local law
enforcement remains intact even if the parallel courts did not
address the specific warning regarding civil penalties pointed
out by the Gonzalez court. This authority at least signifies that
criminal law enforcement of federal immigration law is not out
of the reach of state and local authorities.
III.

THE STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
TO UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

The state and local law enforcement agencies dealing
with the rising population of undocumented immigrants within
their communities have taken various steps to address the
issue. The response taken by the New Hampshire authorities
represents a novel technique, but not the only one. There are
three main categories of responses that state and local
authorities have used recently. First, existing state criminal
statutes have been expanded to cover undocumented
immigrants.121 The second category is similar in that it
involves existing state laws, but distinct in that it deals with
the arguably discriminatory enforcement of laws such as
loitering and criminal nuisance.122 Third, state and local law
enforcement agencies have received specific authority from the
Department of Homeland Security to act as deputies of the
federal immigration law pursuant to Section 287(g) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as amended by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002.123
A.

Expansion of Existing State Laws to Address
Undocumented Immigration

Local authorities have expanded existing state criminal
statutes to cover undocumented immigrants. In the recent
120

Id.
Local New Hampshire law enforcement’s use of the criminal trespass
statute to detain suspected undocumented immigrants is an example of this first
method. See infra Part I.
122
See infra Part III.B.
123
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000).
121
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New Hampshire case, police arrested the eight suspected
undocumented immigrants on separate occasions for criminal
trespass after they produced fake identifications during traffic
stops.124 The current New Hampshire criminal trespass statute
states that “[a] person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing
that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or
remains in any place.”125 The local police from New Ipswich
and Hudson, New Hampshire read this statute as authorizing
them to arrest the suspected undocumented immigrants within
the state’s borders because, as undocumented immigrants, they
do not have any legal permission to be anywhere in the United
States.126
Richard E. Gendron, the police chief in one of the New
Hampshire towns said, “the problem of illegal immigration is a
real one faced by local police officers across the country.”127 He
further stated that he “resorted to local charges after federal
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers declined to
pick up the defendants when [the] officers stopped them earlier
this year and the defendants could not produce valid
immigration documents.”128 Officer Gendron was then quoted
as saying that he still believed that he was “acting within the
mission to enforce the laws of the state of New Hampshire, and
acting in the best interests of the citizens of Hudson and in the
interest of homeland security.”129 This novel interpretation of
the reach of the statute was not explicitly struck down by the
state judge citing a lack of precedent or legislative history on
the subject.130 Instead, the judge relied on federal preemption
standards stating that the charges were unconstitutional
attempts to regulate in the area of enforcing immigration
violations.131 Despite the court’s ruling, some still support the
police chief’s broad interpretation of the criminal trespass
statute. State Representative David Buhlman has stated that
he would seek legislation that would “beef up” the statute to
124
Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants,
FOSTERS, Aug. 12, 2005.
125
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:2 (2005).
126
Wolfe, supra note 4.
127
Vaishnav, supra note 2, at B3.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Wolfe, supra note 4.
131
New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474, 1475 (Nashua D. Ct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/criminal_trespass_
decision.pdf.
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legitimize its use against undocumented immigrants despite
the ruling on federal preemption.132
New Hampshire is not the only state that has
considered using this type of response. State Representative
Courtney Combs of Ohio has announced that he is drafting a
new offense called “state trespass” that would make it a state
criminal offense for an undocumented immigrant to cross
Ohio’s borders.133 The proposal is only a portion of a multitiered program that Combs is hoping to implement with the
help of the Butler County Commissioner and a local Sheriff in
an effort to round up all of the undocumented immigrants in
the state and deport them.134 The proposed plan also involves
adding a charge of falsification against inmates who lie about
their citizenship when they are booked for another crime.135
Once arrested, the state will make a demand to the federal
immigration authorities to begin deportation proceedings or
charge the federal government a fee of seventy dollars a day
per prisoner.136 Butler County has already acted on the threat
by billing the federal government $71,610 to house fifteen
undocumented immigrant prisoners from June to October,
2005.137 It is conceded, however, that this is merely a symbolic
protest since the federal government does not have any
obligation to pay the fines.138 The symbolism behind this
movement and others like it represents the growing frustration
with the inadequate federal government response to the issue
of undocumented immigration. Representative Combs denies
that this is any sort of discrimination against a particular
ethnic group, but instead believes that it is “about national
security and the federal government’s failure to act.”139
Whichever way people feel about Representative Combs’ action,
what seems apparent is that this is just the beginning of states’

132

Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants, supra

note 124.
133

Mari Lolli, Cracking Down on Illegal Aliens, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 22,
2005, at A10.
134
Sheila McLaughlin, Butler Co. Talks Tough on Illegal Immigrants,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 22, 2005, at 1.
135
Id.
136
Id. The charge of seventy dollars is said to offset the cost of keeping these
individuals in state run holding facilities. Id.
137
U.S. Billed For Immigrants, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct. 27, 2005, at 3.
138
Id.
139
Lolli, supra note 133, at A10.
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actions to deal with the growing undocumented immigrant
population.
The local governments in New Hampshire and Ohio are
not the only communities seeking new ways to address
undocumented immigrants. A recent case in Canyon County,
Idaho further exemplifies the trend of local communities
prepared to use creative interpretations of state and local laws
in order to address immigration issues within their regions.140
Canyon County filed suit in the District of Idaho against
several local employers for violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).141 A
violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) requires that an enterprise
be conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity.142
Further, any RICO plaintiff must allege a direct causal link
between the injury and the defendant’s violation in order to
make a valid claim.143 Canyon County claimed that the
defendants used their businesses as “association-in-fact
enterprises for the purpose of obtaining and employing illegal
immigrant workers to reduce labor costs.”144 Canyon County
further asserted that it was harmed by being forced to provide
medical and criminal justice services to these undocumented
immigrants as a direct result of the defendants’ illegal
racketeering activity.145
The court first focused on Canyon County’s standing
based on the alleged harm being inflicted by the defendants.146
The defendants cited the “municipal cost recovery rule” in an
effort to bar Canyon County’s claim.147 This rule holds that “the
cost of public service for the protection from fire or safety
hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed
140
Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., No. CV05-306-S-EJL, 2005 WL
3440474, at *1 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2005).
141
Id.
142
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
143
144
145
146
147

Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the
Canyon County alleged that the racketeering
service.”148
conducted by the defendants constituted criminal activity and
therefore the “public nuisance” exception to the “municipal cost
recovery rule” should apply.149 The court refused to apply this
“public nuisance” exception for two reasons.150 First, the
current Idaho Code does not “specifically identify criminal
conduct as a public nuisance.” Secondly, the court did not see
this as a proper public nuisance claim.151 The court stressed
the fact that Canyon County was not acting as a government
entity “attempting to ‘abate’” a public nuisance in this action.152
Instead, the court labeled the action a civil lawsuit in which
Canyon County was appearing as a private party seeking to
recover damages.153 Therefore, granting the relief sought in
this action would “do nothing to stop or ‘abate’ the Defendants’
alleged criminal conduct.”154 The court went on to state that
the action should be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to
overcome the “basic flaw” that the action was predicated on
recovery for the “costs of municipal services.”155 This critical
decision was celebrated by the local migrant worker council as
a message that the immigration problems cannot be “solved in
this manner.”156 However, the county commissioner, who is just
as determined as Representative Renzullo in New Hampshire
and Representative Combs in Ohio to address the
undocumented immigrant situation without the assistance of
federal authorities, is seeking to appeal this decision.157 It
would not be surprising to see similar actions taken by more
local communities throughout the country if the undocumented
immigrant population continues to expand at its current rate.

148
Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 719 F.2d 322, 323
(9th Cir. 1983) (citing City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (1976)).
149
Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *3.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Canyon County, 2005 WL 3440474, at *6.
156
Rebecca Boone, Judge Dismisses Idaho Lawsuit Against Employers of
Allegedly Illegal Immigrants, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Dec. 15, 2005, at C5.
157
Id.
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Targeted Enforcement of Existing State Laws to Address
Undocumented Immigration

Other state and local enforcement agencies have taken a
different approach to the undocumented immigration problem
by enforcing existing laws in arguably discriminatory ways
rather than expanding those laws’ interpretations or creating
new legislation. In Virginia, twenty-two day laborers were
arrested near a 7-Eleven on a charge of loitering, after being
warned for several weeks that they should not be gathering
around the convenience store.158 The local police denied that
this was an immigration concern, and instead labeled it “purely
However, once the
a community maintenance issue.”159
immigrants were arrested, those that could not produce
identification were immediately taken into custody and officers
performed background checks on them. The investigations
revealed that some of them were flagged with deportation
notices from the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
These men were reported and faced
Enforcement.160
Given the loitering provision’s history of
deportation.161
discriminatory enforcement in the past,162 the local immigrant
population may have reason to become alarmed about the
precedent that these arrests have created.163 The local police
still maintain, however, that deportation of these individuals
was not the ultimate goal of the arrests. They claim that the
arrests were in response to numerous complaints from local
citizens regarding the disorderly conduct of some of the day
laborers.164
Similar community maintenance concerns were used as
the justification for the raiding and closing of a home in

158

Ward, supra note 28, at B1.
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
In Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance
which prohibited “‘criminal street gang members’ from ‘loitering’ with one another or
with other persons in any public place” due to a vagueness violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The Court concluded
that the ordinance afforded “too much discretion to the police and too little notice to
citizens who wish to use the public streets.” It further stated that the ordinance’s
“relative importance to its application to harmless loitering is magnified by its
inapplicability to loitering that has an obviously threatening or illicit purpose.” 527
U.S. 41, 45-46, 63-64 (1999).
163
Ward, supra note 28, at B1.
164
Id.
159
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Farmingville, New York, which sheltered as many as sixty-four
male occupants believed to be day laborers.165 This was the
first house in the locality to be shut down for illegal
overcrowding, and the raid resulted in an additional 117 people
being targeted for investigation.166 The police arrested the
owner of the home on criminal contempt and criminal nuisance
charges due to her failure to adhere to State Supreme Court
orders regarding compliance with building codes.167 Supporters
of the immigrant workers point out that a discriminatory
intent may have been present because non-immigrant homes in
neighboring communities would violate the specific text of the
illegal overcrowding ordinance yet were not targeted.168 County
executive Steve Levy has argued that he is merely enforcing
the law.169 However, he also admitted to first trying to deputize
165
Bruce Lambert, L.I. Home Held Up to 64 Men, Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2005, at B1.
166
Id.
167
Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50 (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.45 (McKinney 2000).

Criminal contempt in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal contempt in the second degree when he engages
in any of the following conduct:
...
3. Intentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other
mandate of a court except in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes
as defined by subdivision two of section seven hundred fifty-three-a of the
judiciary law; or
...
6. Intentional failure to obey any mandate, process or notice, issued pursuant
to articles sixteen of the judiciary law, or to rules adopted pursuant to any
such statute or to any special statute establishing commissioners of jurors
and prescribing their duties or who refuses to be sworn as provided
therein . . . .
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.50.
Criminal nuisance in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal nuisance in the second degree when:
1. By conduct either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all the
circumstances, he knowingly or recklessly creates or maintains a condition
which endangers the safety or health of a considerable number of persons; or
2. He knowingly conducts or maintains any premises, place or resort where
persons gather for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45.
168
Lambert, supra note 165.
169
Paul Vitello, Responding to the Law of ‘Nimby,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2005,
at 14LI.
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county police officers as federal immigration agents before
being halted by the police union, thereby calling his stated
innocuous motivation into question.170
C.

Recruitment of State and Local Enforcement Agencies by
the Federal Government

Although Mr. Levy did not have much success in his
attempt to deputize his local police force, other states have
effectively implemented such programs.
The judge that
handed down the opinion in the New Hampshire case
specifically stated that there were provisions in the federal law
under which local authorities could be deputized to enforce
federal immigration law.171
On August 15, 2005, Arizona Governor Janet
Napolitano declared a state of emergency along the state
border in an effort to provide relief to areas affected by a rising
undocumented immigrant population and an increasing
amount of cross-border crime.172 This action freed up both state
and federal emergency funds that are normally reserved for
natural disasters.173 Prior to this declaration, Napolitano
expressed disappointment and impatience with the federal
government’s “red tape,” and its inability to provide any
The
response to the immigration issues in her state.174
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael
Chertoff, finally gave in to the requests for action and offered to
coordinate efforts between the federal agencies and the local
The Arizona Department of
police forces in Arizona.175
Corrections and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on
September 16, 2005.176 This agreement set forth the terms by
which the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau
authorizes qualified state law enforcement personnel to

170
171

Id.
Judge Dismisses Trespassing Charges Against Illegal Immigrants, supra

note 124.
172
Michael Marizco, State Grants Pima $415K in Border-Emergency Funds,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 29, 2005, at B4.
173
Id.
174
Steven Bodzin, Homeland Security Agrees to Coordinate With State Police,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2005, at A17.
175
Id.
176
Memorandum of Understanding (Sept. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/050920phoenix.htm.
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perform certain functions of an immigration officer.177 The
authority to enter into this agreement comes from Section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 207-276.178
The agreement contains specific terms and conditions
under which the federal and state departments must operate,179
including: the procedures for nominating and training
personnel, supplying certification and authorization, and the
supervision activities of the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency.180 This last section is significant given the
concerns surrounding such a delegation of power.
It
specifically affirms that state corrections personnel “cannot
perform any immigration officer functions pursuant to DHS
authorities . . . except when working under the supervision of
an ICE officer.”181 The agreement goes on to state that the
actions of state personnel “will be reviewed by the ICE [agents]
on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the immigration laws and procedures and to
assess the need for additional training or guidance for that
specific individual.”182
IV.

THE IMPROPER USE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TO ADDRESS UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS; DEPUTIZING IS THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE

The expansion and discriminatory enforcement of
existing state laws to address undocumented immigration
suffer from two critical flaws.
First, these tactics
impermissibly expand the powers that are recognized within
the states’ authority under statutory law and case law and are
in direct contradiction to established federal authority. Second,
the methods imposed by these state and local authorities are
not effective in addressing the concerns of their local
communities and are merely shortsighted solutions to
particularly complex issues. These state and local agencies
should therefore rely on their ability to work in coordination
with the federal authorities as deputies of federal immigration
177
178
179
180
181
182

Id. ¶ I.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2000).
Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 176, ¶ I.
Id. ¶ IV-VII, IX.
Id. ¶ IX.
Id.
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law as a more effective solution to their local concerns
regarding undocumented immigrants.
A.

State and Local Actions Represent an Unlawful
Expansion of Established Authority

The state and local authorities are in direct conflict with
established law when they choose to address the undocumented
immigrant situation by either expanding or discriminatorily
enforcing their existing state laws. These methods go beyond
the limited recognized authority that state and local agencies
have in the enforcement of immigration laws.
More
importantly, these tactics severely hamper the uniformity
requirement that is inherent within all foreign policy areas in
which the field of immigration law is undoubtedly a member.
Unlike the federal government, the states do not have
any expressed constitutional authority over foreign policy.183
However, this does not mean that they are completely devoid of
the ability to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws.
The courts have already determined that the
Immigration and Naturalization Act “cannot be inferred [to
mean] that the federal government has occupied the field of
criminal immigration enforcement.”184 The Act even provides
specific provisions that allow state and local police officers to
act as immigration officers within certain limitations.185
This established authority has its limits. By accepting
the concept that state and local law enforcement personnel
have the inherent authority to make arrests under the federal
immigration law, one must also accept the fact that this
authority is limited to enforcement and does not include any
permission to regulate.186 Proposing otherwise would contradict
the Supreme Court’s idea that “the federal government, as
represented by Congress, has nearly complete power to
determine immigration policies, thereby restricting the states
183
Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal Supremacy, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 940 (1995).
184
Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
See also supra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
185
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(c), 1324(c), & 1357(g) (2000) (different provisions
within title 8 of the United States Code specifically authorizing limited arrest powers
to “state or local law enforcement officials” and “others whose duty it is to enforce
criminal laws”).
186
See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (stating that the “[p]ower to
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power”).
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from enacting immigration legislation of their own.”187
However, the Court has never held that every state law that
somehow deals with aliens is “a regulation of immigration and
thus per se pre-empted.”188 Federal authority is preemptive of
state regulatory power only when there are “persuasive
reasons—either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained.”189
When state and local authorities expand or interpret
local laws as tools to deal with undocumented immigration, as
they hope to do in New Hampshire and Virginia, they are
impermissibly entering into the area of immigration regulation.
Congress has unmistakably spoken regarding the limited role
that state and local law enforcement agencies may play in the
arrest of individuals for immigration violations.
Indeed,
Congress has provided specific statutes in each instance where
it deemed it appropriate.190 These statutes carry with them
conditions and prerequisites by which state and local
When the states target
authorities must abide.191
undocumented immigrants by creating new expansive trespass
laws or by discriminatorily enforcing a nuisance statute, they
are granting themselves new powers that are entirely separate
from those enumerated in the federal code. This expanded
authority goes “directly to the subject matter of sanctions and
penalties for immigration violations set forth in the INA,” and
are therefore preempted by federal authority.192
Most importantly, if state and local authorities were
permitted to unilaterally create new immigration regulation in
this manner they would be working directly against any
attempt to have a uniform federal immigration policy. The

187
188
189

Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 55.
DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 356. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,

142 (1963)).
190

Supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000) (explicitly authorizes state and local police to
make arrests of undocumented immigrants who have committed a felony and have
been previously deported, but “only after the State or local law enforcement officials
obtain appropriate confirmation from the Immigration and Naturalization Service of
the status of such individual and only for such a period of time as may be required for
the Service to take the individual into Federal custody for purposes of deporting or
removing the alien from the United States”).
192
New Hampshire v. Barros-Batistele, No. 05-CR-1474, 1475 (Nashua D. Ct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/district/criminal_trespass_
decision.pdf.
191
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“very nature” of immigration regulation and its impact on
foreign relations provide persuasive reasons why this should
not be permitted.193 If Ohio and New Hampshire, or their
respective municipalities, passed their own trespass laws
covering undocumented immigrants there would be no
obligation on either party to pass identical or even similar
regulations. Their definitions could be entirely independent of
each other and therefore treat the same federally determined
undocumented immigrant in drastically different ways.
The discriminatory enforcement of state and local laws
such as nuisance and loitering, which is the other technique
used by state and local law enforcement, lacks uniformity even
within the borders of the municipality that is practicing it.
This impact would only be exacerbated when brought to a
nationwide basis. The end result would be a single country
with a “thousand borders” which would be in direct conflict
with the “constitutional mandate for uniform immigration
laws.”194
B.

State and Local Actions are Ineffective

The conflict with established law is not the only
difficulty that the states will face in adopting these methods to
address their local undocumented immigration issues. These
methods are ineffective since they do not address the primary
issue and involve various difficulties in their implementation.
These tactics not only fail to reach their supposed goals, but
also promote a distrust of state and local authorities with the
potential to further disrupt the lives of the local residents.
The fact that the loitering arrests in Virginia revealed
undocumented immigrants that are already facing deportation
procedures195 does not justify the use of these statutes in this
manner. The clearest counter to this justification is the fact
that the state and local law enforcement agencies already have
the authority to arrest individuals that they have probable
cause to believe are undocumented immigrants.196 The case law
supports this approach and it is consistent with the rest of the
existing immigration authority.197 The law does not support
193
194
195
196
197

See supra notes 58-93 and accompanying text.
Pham, supra note 59, at 967.
Ward, supra note 28, at B1.
See supra Part II.C.
Id.

2007]

CAN WE MAKE THE RULES, TOO?

683

arresting individuals that fit a broad category of stereotypical
norms.198 It should be pointed out that half of the supposed
loiterers that were arrested in Virginia actually had valid
documentation and were eventually released.199 This rate of
success should not be deemed an acceptable justification for
rounding up individuals based on certain patterns of activity or
appearance that fit a “typical” undocumented immigrant.
The closing of the crowded house in Long Island, New
York addresses the situation with little more success than the
arrests in Virginia. The individuals that were living within the
home were not evicted and there were no reports that they
were either arrested or submitted to any form of immigration
proceedings.200 The individuals were merely forced out onto the
streets to look for accommodations elsewhere, thereby pushing
them out into neighboring communities, without solving the
true national concerns that these local authorities rely on as
their principal reason for acting in the first place. The court in
Canyon County spotted this as a principal reason why the
public nuisance claim should fail, since the civil claim was not
directly targeted at abetting the practice of hiring
undocumented immigrants.201
The lack of federal cooperation at the outset of these
independent actions only adds to the difficulty.
The
individuals that are eventually taken into custody are not
guaranteed to reach the national agencies that can administer
available solutions through deportation hearings if necessary
or through proper immigration filings to gain legitimate status
to remain and work within the United States.202 Due to this
fact, all individuals arrested by the state will be held in local
jails, thus costing state and local communities more.
Furthermore, the state system is not one that can address
immigration issues. The states cannot propose it would be in
their interests to construct a local immigration processing
facility to administer immigration proceedings the federal
198
United States v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (holding that
the targeting of individuals based on their apparent Mexican ancestry by immigration
officers was a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
199
Ward, supra note 28, at B1.
200
Lambert, supra note 165, at B1.
201
Canyon County v. Syngenta Seed, Inc., No. CV05-306-S-EJL, 2005 WL
3440474, at *3 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2005).
202
The CBP and ICE Bureaus of the federal government have exclusive
authority over the functions of border patrol, detention and removal. Divine, supra
note 56.
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government currently controls. The costs and administration
of such a system would pose tremendous burdens to law
enforcement agencies that are already complaining about the
costs of these quick fix approaches.203
Proponents of these tactics still argue that the
proliferation of undocumented immigration is a threat to
national security and could expose the country to terrorism.204
It is conceded that the Department of Homeland Security has
taken a stricter stance on border control as a direct response to
this very concern.205 However, it is a much more difficult
proposition to argue that the arrests of a group of day laborers
gathered around a 7-Eleven206 addresses this issue with any
degree of effectiveness. The loiterers arrested in Virginia were
never initially accused or investigated for any supposed threat
to national security.207 It is possible that the expansion of
criminal laws such as the trespass laws could provide the
sufficient breadth to address any individual suspected of
terrorism ties. Proponents of this idea are quick to point out
that three of the suicide terrorists hijackers from the
September 11th attacks were all stopped by local police forces
for traffic violations, but were eventually released without any
This
involvement of federal immigration authorities.208
terrorist attack was unquestionably one of the worst
experiences in our national history. However, the malevolence
that surrounded it should not further disrupt our way of life by
permitting arbitrary arrests and unlawful interrogations.
The proliferation of these discriminatory practices is one
of the principle reasons why opponents of the state and local
enforcement of immigration laws feel that there will be a
detrimental impact on the lives of those affected by such an
administration.209 The big difficulty that arises is the distrust
amongst the general population of the state and local
authorities called to implement this sort of administration.210
203

See Pham, supra note 59, at 984.
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 327-28.
205
Yale-Loehr, supra note 50, at 57.
206
Ward, supra note 28, at B1.
207
Id.
208
Sessions & Hayden, supra note 8, at 327-28.
209
Three main concerns surrounding the local enforcement of immigration
law are: 1) the lack of training in the intricacies of immigration law that may result in
racial profiling, 2) a general distrust of local police amongst immigrant communities,
and 3) deprivation of police resources. Pham, supra note 59, at 981.
210
Id. at 983-84.
204
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The basic idea surrounding this theory is that the state and
local authorities lack the training and expertise to make valid
arrests or inquiries and may choose to use inappropriate
signals such as apparent ethnicity or race to determine
whether or not to inquire about a person’s immigration
status.211 This distrust of local authorities could have severe
impacts on the way people carry out their daily lives.212 Some
municipalities such as New York City have addressed this
concern by prohibiting certain city officers and public
employees from inquiring about someone’s immigration
status.213 This policy was part of an effort to ensure that all
residents regardless of their immigration status receive critical
services such as emergency healthcare and police protection.214
C.

Deputizing State and Local Authorities Represents a
Better Solution

This is not a proposal to eliminate local enforcement of
immigration laws within the United States.215 It is merely a
suggestion that there is a more effective and efficient way of
approaching the situation that does not tread on preemptive
authority while at the same time adding significant controls
against discrimination and non-uniformity. One such approach
is the authority to deputize local law enforcement agencies to
work for, and under the supervision of, national immigration
authorities.216 Indeed this has been listed as the first step in
211

Id. at 982-83.
Id. at 983-84 (stating that Hispanic communities have neglected to inform
police about situations revolving around the sniper attacks in October 2002 out of a
fear of being investigated for their immigration status).
213
In the wake of the sweeping reforms of the PATRIOT Act, New York City
Mayor Bloomberg issued Executive Order 41 on September 17, 2003 in an effort to
ensure that “all New Yorkers, including immigrants, can access City services that they
need and are entitled to receive.” The executive order protects the confidentiality of a
broad range of information including immigration status.
Anyone who seeks
assistance from the police will not be asked about their immigration status unless
there is a suspicion of illegal or criminal activity. It assures those seeking city services
that they will not be asked about their immigration status unless it is necessary to
provide those services. The order further instructs city workers to hold any
information regarding immigrant status completely confidential. Mayor’s Office of
Immigrant Affairs, Mayor Bloomberg’s Executive Order 41 Protects All New Yorkers,
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/imm/downloads/pdf/eo41english.pdf.
214
Id.
215
Some writers have supported the position that any state and local
enforcement of immigration laws would be a bad policy to follow regardless of the
involvement of federal authorities. See Pham, supra note 59, at 987-1003.
216
8 U.S.C. §1357(g) (2000).
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any practical implementation of an immigration law
enforcement program in a local jurisdiction.217
This method of law enforcement addresses almost all of
the flaws inherent in the previously mentioned techniques.
The state and local authorities will be trained to “avoid actions
that could constitute unconstitutional discrimination against
citizens and lawfully-present aliens on the basis of national
origin or foreign appearance.”218 Moreover, these actions will be
under the direct supervision and authority of the federal
agencies that can actually take federally reserved actions such
as deportation.219 Most importantly, all deputized state and
local authorities would be enforcing the single federal
immigration law.220 This is in sharp contrast to the nonuniform tactics of creating new expansive trespass laws or
discriminatorily enforcing public nuisance regulations. The
burden, however, lies on the state governments to request this
assistance and on federal authorities to act once they are
asked, instead of waiting for a governor to declare a state of
emergency before agreeing to cooperate.221
V.

CONCLUSION

State and local authorities should not feel powerless in
their attempts to address the undocumented immigrant
situations within their communities. The current federal
structure of immigration regulation leaves room for the
involvement of state and local officials. Those officials have
specific authority to enforce the federal immigration law when
it comes to criminal violations and can even enter into specific
agreements with the federal government to receive the training
and supervision necessary to allow their agencies to take on
more expansive roles in the area of immigration enforcement.
Conflicts only arise when the state and local authorities take it
upon themselves to unilaterally create new immigration
regulation whether by directly enacting new expansive laws or
enforcing existing laws in a targeted manner against
undocumented immigrants. These tactics not only go against
217

Hethmon, supra note 75, at 126.
Id. at 125-26.
219
News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DHS, ICE,
State of Arizona and ADC Agree to Speed Criminal Alien Removals (Sept. 20, 2005),
available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/050920phoenix.htm.
220
Id.
221
See Marizco, supra note 172, at B4.
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established law, but present further difficulties for the local
communities that are forced to deal with them. It would be
more appropriate for these state and local entities to adhere to
their federally structured authority in order to protect against
unlawful discrimination and preserve a single unified
immigration policy across the entire nation.222
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